

11 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF DIVISION

SUBJECT: Report to National Security Council by the Psychological Strategy Board, Comment by PY/OS.

REFERENCE: Memorandum from CPY, subject: Report to National Security Council by the Psychological Strategy Board, dated 2 July 1952. (a)

1. Reference (a), enclosure 1, paragraph 1: Policy originates from a multiplicity of sources, and frequent interpretations and amplifications prove confusing because of apparent inconsistencies and shifts of emphasis. Your attention is invited to the fact that Western Hemisphere's Strategic Plan has rationalized all the policy statements affecting it in a most thorough and painstaking manner. The resulting plan (which may be seen on the BIG BOARD) may be taken as a model.

2. Comment: A single clear statement of policy is required, and it is important that that policy remain in effect long enough to be implemented. ✓

3. Reference (a), enclosure 1, paragraph 2: Insofar as this activity is concerned, U. S. capabilities have decreased, due to the loss of personnel and the increased load of internal organizational staff work which contributes nothing to fighting the war. (For two weeks, all hands have been thus unprofitably engaged.) By not being permitted to complete our consultant group we have lost much of the capability we should have next season.

Progressive Communist infiltration and control of communication media throughout the world has further reduced our capabilities, as e.g., increased control of motion picture houses in Southeast Asia.

4. Reference (a), enclosure 1, paragraph 3: Only a very small fraction of the capabilities of OS have been exploited.

Capabilities which should be reinforced specifically are:

a. Our capability of exploiting media must be increased by the completion of the consultant group which includes penetration of three news services, several publishing houses and a number of other mass communication media facilities. The building of this capability costs nothing and would have been accomplished by this time, had it been permitted.

b. There is no PW quality control facility.


5. Reference (a), enclosure 1, paragraph 4: The principal factors which impede the successful prosecution of our national psychological program are:

a. Lack of authority under which all instruments of national policy can be employed in implementation of a single plan.

b. Lack of a plan which employs all instruments of national policy. (The lack of such a plan may well result in much waste effort and canceling of the effect of PW actions, despite efforts at coordination.)

c. Organizational deficiencies in the activities charged with PW, as a result of which most plans die of bureaucratic strangulation, e.g. CANCELLATION, completed and approved by all agencies concerned more than a year ago and still the subject of position papers.

It will be noted that coordination of planning between areas via the BIG BOARD progresses apace and that informal coordination between Opc and other activities of government which have PW effect is in process and bids fair to contribute to overcoming some of the deficiencies listed.



Psychological Staff Division

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FROM:

Py, Chief/OS

NO.

DATE

15 July 52

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		REC'D	FWD'D		
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